Georgia Supreme Court Hands Catoosa GOP Another Loss
In what is becoming a familiar theme, the Georgia Supreme Court handed down their opinion in Catoosa County Republican Party et al. v. Henry et al, giving the “volunteer grandmothers” and their attorneys, Georgia Republican Assembly (GRA) President J. Alex Johnson, Esq., Johnson’s law partner, Catherine Bernard, and 11th District Republican Party Chair David Oles another loss in court. Ironically, in a case where the Defendants argued it was the Constitutional right to deny thousands of Catoosa County Republican voters the right to decide who would be their GOP nominee, the Supreme Court issued their decision on Constitution Day.
Any mystery as to which direction the Court had leaned was quickly dispatched by Justice Nels Peterson’s first, two-word sentence in the Court’s ruling: “Elections matter.”
However, rather than going into the Constitutional questions raised by the Defendants, the Court punted by simply saying, in essence, that the Defendants and their attorneys did not expediate the case and the Court was unwilling to void an election that had already occurred.
The Court did note that the defendants had plenty of opportunity to file for expedited review, but one of the many delays that the defendants imposed on themselves was filing the appeal with the wrong court. The Supreme Court notes this saying, “Although the trial court worked quickly to resolve the parties’ dispute prior to the qualifying deadline, and the CCRP [Catoosa County Republican Party] Defendants quickly filed a notice of appeal, any sense of urgency apparently ended at that point. The CCRP Defendants appealed to the wrong court — with a notice of appeal that jumbled the questions of subject matter jurisdiction and procedural jurisdiction — and filed nothing in that court after the case was docketed there.”
The Court further adds, “Once the appeal was transferred to this Court on April 12, at which point the election was less than six weeks away — possibly enough time to consider the merits of the CCRP Defendants’ appeal, but only if the timetable for deciding the case were expedited — the CCRP Defendants did not seek expedited review or emergency relief.”
In addition to the delay caused by filing with the wrong court, the Court outlines other failures by the Defendants through their attorneys, that prevented the case from being decided until long after the election:
- On April 30, Defendants filed for an extension to file their principal brief which was due May 6. The Defendants filed their brief on the last day of the new, later deadline.
- The Defendants agreed to hold oral arguments (the Court eventually denied the request) in the case, but never asked for oral arguments to be expedited, but asked for the oral arguments to be held AFTER the run-off election “to confirm who shall make said oral argument.”
- The Defendants failed to make any objection to the time frame for oral argument.
- Finally, the Defendants did not file their reply brief until June 20, after the primary election and run-off.
While Peterson’s unanimous opinion focused on the reasons for the dismissal, Justice Charlie Bethel took the opportunity in his concurring opinion to address some of the underlying Constitutional arguments. While the concurring opinion does not directly address the legal issues arising from this appeal from the CCRP, Bethel states that the Court should expect to address these issues at some point, and, therefore, gives some guidance as to how the Court may lean in its interpretation of State Election laws.
Bethel writes, “It seems likely to me that ‘party’ is inclusive of party organizations that have secured ballot access privileges under Georgia law, such as the Georgia Republican Party (GRP) and the Democratic Party of Georgia (DPG). It is not at all clear to me, however—and the CCRP Defendants have not meaningfully grappled with the issue—that the “party” referenced in OCGA § 21-2-153 (b) extends beyond such entities to county-level party organizations like the CCRP. Of course, I cannot and do not express any opinion about the proper reach of ‘party,’ as that term is used in OCGA § 21-2-153 (b), as it is unnecessary to the resolution of this case. Rather, I flag the question for more serious consideration if and when the theory espoused by the CCRP Defendants returns to this Court.”
Bethel concludes urging the “Solicitor General, the DPG, the GRP, and any other interested parties [to] weigh in as amicus curiae on this important issue.”
The irony of the complete and total failure of the Defendants’ attorneys to comply with the procedural rules of filing the appeal cannot be overstated enough as the case really boils down to what constitutes “procedural rules” when it comes to qualifying. It has long been the legal opinion of Johnson that “procedural rules” includes the subjective determination of what constitutes a true Republican. The leadership of the CCRP, rather than being termed “volunteer grandmothers” as the GRA has done in newsletter articles covering the events of the case, should be referred to as “volunteer guinea pigs” as they have becoming willing partners in Johnson’s experiment in tyranny, believing only the leadership, and not the membership (i.e. Republican voters), of the party should pick the nominees. Sadly, they are not only taking their bad legal advice from attorneys who do not seem to understand the Constitutional right of association, but also do not seem to understand basic appellate procedure.
If the attorneys were freshly out of law school, maybe one could forgive the lack of preparation, but all three have been trial attorneys for more than a decade. Alex Johnson was admitted to the Bar the same year I was, 2010, after graduating from Georgia State University College of Law. Catherine Bernard has been a member of the Georgia Bar since 2008 after graduating from the University of Virginia. David Oles was admitted to the Georgia Bar in 1999 and is a graduate of Harvard Law School. Combined, the three have over 55 years of legal experience in Georgia.
It would have only taken a little legal research for the trio to realize they needed to complete their appeal BEFORE, and not after the election. The cases cited in the Court’s opinion clearly outline precedent on the issue, but, in reality, Johnson, Bernard, and Oles have not built their practices on handling election disputes, but on criminal defense (Johnson and Bernard) and divorce (Oles). None of the attorneys as of the writing of this article lists “election law” as one of their practice areas.
Contrast that to the experience of Bryan Tyson, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs, whose legal career has focused on election law and whose bar profile lists ONLY election law and appellate practice:
But it’s not just that the attorneys for the Defendants were inexperienced in the subject matter, but it does not seem in light of the Supreme Court’s decision that they took the opportunity to avail themselves of the basic information they would need to competently conduct this case.
Even the trial judge, Don Thompson, had at one point noted that the CCRP and its leadership were getting bad legal advice, which he declined to jail them for contempt of Court.
As to that issue, the Supreme Court did mention the contempt of court fines, but noted that the trial court would handle them in a hearing that was yet to be held.
