A Section by Section Break Down of the Tort Reform Bill

SB 68, Governor Brian Kemp’s tort reform packaged was debated on the House Floor today. Special interests on both sides have spent millions of dollars telling us why either the bill is necessary or why it is terrible with business interests on one side and trial lawyers on the other.

But what does the bill actually do? What are the details? Is it possible to take the legalese in the bill and explain it in laymen’s terms?

Challenge accepted.

Here is a break down of each section of what the bill does in a way I hope the average Georgian can understand. Caveat here: I am not an attorney, so if I have gotten something wrong here, be sure to take to the comments and let me know.


Section 1– Arguing Monetary Value of Pain and Suffering (Code Section 9-10-184):

Section 1 of this legislation revises Georgia Code Section 9-10-184, which addresses how attorneys may argue the value of pain and suffering or other noneconomic damages during trials involving bodily injury or wrongful death.

Definitions Provided (New Addition):

  • Economic Damages (newly defined clearly in this section): These are tangible, financial losses due to injury or death, such as medical expenses, therapy, lost wages, earning capacity, and funeral costs.
  • Noneconomic Damages (newly defined clearly): These are intangible losses such as pain, emotional suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of companionship, or damage to one’s reputation.

Changes from Current Law:

  • Previously (struck language):
    • Attorneys were broadly allowed to argue the monetary value of pain and suffering without specific restrictions.
  • Now (newly added language):
    • Attorneys are generally prohibited from arguing or mentioning specific monetary amounts or ranges of noneconomic damages in front of juries until after all evidence has been presented and during their initial argument about damages.
    • The argument about noneconomic damages must now be directly connected to the evidence provided during the trial. Attorneys cannot refer to unrelated examples or hypothetical scenarios.
    • If an attorney has the right to speak both first and last (opening and closing arguments), they can only discuss the monetary value of noneconomic damages in their closing argument if they have already done so in their opening. Additionally, the monetary value argued in the closing cannot differ from what was mentioned in the opening.
    • The law sets clear consequences if an attorney improperly introduces prohibited arguments or testimony about noneconomic damages. Courts are required to take corrective actions, including possibly excusing jurors who heard the prohibited information.

Clarifications:

  • Attorneys are still permitted to question potential jurors during jury selection (voir dire) about whether they could award no damages or whether they could award damages above an unspecified amount, provided this question relates directly to evidence.

Why this Matters:

This revision significantly changes how attorneys must handle arguments about noneconomic damages, imposing clearer boundaries intended to reduce potential jury influence by unsupported claims or exaggerated monetary suggestions.

In short, Section 1 tightens the rules regarding how lawyers present and argue the monetary value of pain and suffering and other intangible damages, aiming to ensure the jury bases its decisions solely on evidence presented in court.


Section 2 – Timing of Defendant’s Answer, Motions for Clarity, and Discovery Procedures (Code Section 9-11-12):

Section 2 of this legislation revises Georgia Code Section 9-11-12, dealing with the timeline and requirements for defendants responding to lawsuits, the ability to request clarification of vague claims, and rules governing the pausing (“stay”) of discovery (the legal process of exchanging information between parties).

Key Changes to Current Law:

(a) Timing of Defendant’s Answer:

Previous Law:

  • A defendant had 30 days from the date they received the summons and complaint to serve their answer.

New Law (with added specifics):

  • Still maintains 30 days as the standard deadline.
  • Adds clarification: If a defendant files a motion (for example, a motion to dismiss or for clarification of the complaint), the deadline to file an answer is adjusted:
    • If the court denies or postpones ruling on the defendant’s motion until trial, the defendant now has 15 days from notice of the court’s decision to serve their answer.
    • If the court grants a motion requiring the plaintiff to clarify their claims (“motion for a more definite statement”), the defendant must serve an answer within 15 days after receiving that clarified complaint.

(e) Motion for More Definite Statement:

Previous Law:

  • If a pleading (like a complaint) was too vague or ambiguous, the responding party had to answer to the best of their ability but could also ask for clarification from the court. The law did not clearly specify the timeline to comply with an order clarifying a vague complaint.

New Law:

  • Clearly specifies a timeframe: If the court orders a plaintiff to clarify a vague complaint, the plaintiff must comply within 15 days of receiving the order, unless the court sets a different deadline.
  • If the plaintiff does not comply within this timeframe, the court has the authority to strike (remove) the vague pleading or otherwise handle it as the court considers fair.

(j) Stay (Pause) of Discovery:

Previous Law:

  • Discovery could be paused if a motion to dismiss was filed, but the timeline and conditions were less clearly defined.

New Law (specific changes):

  • If a defendant files a motion to dismiss either before or at the same time as their answer, discovery is automatically paused for up to 90 days or until the court decides the motion, whichever comes first.
  • If the defendant files an answer before the court rules on the motion, the stay ends immediately.
  • The discovery timeline is extended by the length of any stay (pause).
  • The law clearly instructs the court that it must rule on the motion within 90 days after the briefing is finished.
  • If the court hasn’t ruled within the 90-day timeframe, the court can, on its own or at a party’s request, end or modify (but not extend) the pause in discovery. The law explicitly allows parties to seek other legal remedies (like a writ of mandamus) if the court delays too long.
  • The new rules explicitly allow limited discovery to continue even during the pause if:
    • Discovery is necessary to identify people who should be included in the case or to clarify if the court has proper jurisdiction.
    • The motion to dismiss raises certain specific defenses (such as lack of jurisdiction or improper service).

Why These Changes Matter:

  • Clarity and Efficiency: These changes clarify timelines for both defendants and plaintiffs, promoting more efficient litigation and preventing indefinite delays.
  • Fairness: Clarifying exactly when answers are due or when discovery must resume helps avoid unfair advantages due to procedural confusion.

In short, Section 2 aims to streamline the litigation process, making deadlines explicit and enforcing clearer rules on when parties must act or respond in civil court cases.


Section 3 Changes to Voluntary Dismissal of Lawsuits (Code Section 9-11-41):

This section addresses the rules about how and when a plaintiff (the person who initiates a lawsuit) can voluntarily dismiss their own case without needing court approval, as well as the impact of such dismissals.


Key Changes Compared to Current Law:

Current Law (being removed):

  • A plaintiff could voluntarily dismiss their lawsuit by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the first witness is sworn during the trial.

New Law (language added):

  • A plaintiff’s right to dismiss without court approval is now more limited. The new cutoff is significantly earlier: the plaintiff must file their dismissal notice within 60 days after the defendant serves their answer to the initial complaint. After this period, the plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss the case without the court’s permission.
  • Plaintiffs can still voluntarily dismiss a case at any time if all parties involved in the lawsuit agree in writing (by stipulation).

Effects of Voluntary Dismissal Clarified by New Law:

  • If a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses their case within the allowed timeframe (60 days after answer) or by stipulation, the dismissal is typically “without prejudice.” This means the plaintiff may refile the lawsuit again later.
  • However, under the new law, if the plaintiff previously dismissed a lawsuit in any federal or state court involving the same claim, then another dismissal notice is treated as an “adjudication on the merits”, meaning it is a final dismissal and the claim cannot be brought again.
  • After the 60-day deadline, a plaintiff who wishes to dismiss the case must now get court approval. If a defendant has filed a counterclaim, the lawsuit cannot be dismissed unless the defendant’s counterclaim can continue independently.

Why These Changes Matter:

  • Prevents Last-Minute Dismissals: By changing from “before the first witness is sworn” (potentially mid-trial) to a clear 60-day deadline after the defendant answers, the law reduces disruptions and prevents plaintiffs from dismissing a case at the last minute or after extensive trial preparation.
  • Encourages Earlier Decisions: This rule incentivizes plaintiffs to decide earlier in the litigation whether they want to proceed with their claim, reducing unnecessary court and legal expenses.

In short, Section 3 provides clearer and stricter rules on when a plaintiff can voluntarily drop their case, protecting defendants from late-stage dismissals and ensuring more efficient court procedures.


Section 4 – Limitations on Recovery of Attorney’s Fees, Court Costs, and Litigation Expenses (New Code Section 9-15-16):

This section introduces entirely new provisions regarding how attorney’s fees, court costs, and litigation expenses can be awarded or proved in civil lawsuits in Georgia.


Detailed Explanation of the New Provisions:

(a) No Double Recovery of Fees or Costs:

  • New Rule (Newly Added):
    • Parties in a lawsuit cannot receive attorney’s fees, court costs, or litigation expenses more than once under multiple statutes or laws.
    • Even if several statutes might allow a party to recover fees or costs, the party can only collect these fees or costs once, unless the law explicitly allows for collecting these fees multiple times.
  • Reason for Change:
    • Prevents plaintiffs or defendants from “stacking” or multiplying awards from different laws to collect excessive attorney’s fees or litigation costs for essentially the same legal work or expenses.

(b) Admissibility of Contingency Fee Agreements:

  • New Rule (Newly Added):
    • If attorney’s fees are claimed based on any statute that awards “reasonable attorney’s fees,” the specific agreement between a lawyer and client that sets attorney compensation as a percentage of recovery (contingency fee agreement) cannot be introduced as evidence to prove that the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable.
  • Practical Meaning:
    • Lawyers often represent clients under agreements to receive a portion of any awarded damages. The percentage agreed upon cannot be used as evidence to show that the attorney’s fees are fair or reasonable in court. Instead, fees must be justified through other methods or evidence.
  • Reason for Change:
    • Ensures attorney’s fees awarded by courts are based on objective evidence and standards, rather than just the percentage arrangement privately agreed to between a lawyer and their client.

(c) Protection of Contractual Rights:

  • New Rule (Newly Added):
    • Nothing in this new law restricts or lessens parties’ rights to recover attorney’s fees or litigation costs if those rights are explicitly stated in a contract between the parties.
  • Practical Meaning:
    • If two parties have a contract specifying that one must pay the other’s attorney’s fees or court costs, that contract remains valid and enforceable.

Why These Changes Matter:

  • Fairness & Reasonableness: These provisions aim to keep attorney’s fees fair, clearly defined, and prevent inflating or doubling of awards for attorney fees and court costs.
  • Transparency: Prohibiting contingency fee agreements as evidence ensures attorney’s fees awards remain objectively fair.
  • Protection for Parties: Clearly preserves existing contractual rights, ensuring that business and individual agreements remain protected and enforceable.

In short, Section 4 prevents double recovery of legal fees, restricts how attorney’s fees can be justified, and protects existing contractual agreements regarding fees and costs.


Section 5 – Use of Seat Belt Evidence in Court (Code Section 40-8-76.1):

This section updates Georgia law regarding whether evidence about a person’s use (or non-use) of a seat belt can be introduced in court to help determine fault, negligence, or damages in civil lawsuits involving vehicle accidents.


Detailed Explanation of Changes:

Previous Law (Language Removed):

  • Under the prior law, if someone involved in a car accident was not wearing their seat belt, this fact:
    • Could NOT be used as evidence to show that the person was negligent, at fault, or that their injuries were caused or worsened by their decision not to buckle up.
    • Could not be used by insurance companies to justify increasing insurance rates or canceling coverage.

In other words, previously, courts and juries were not allowed to consider seat belt use (or lack thereof) at all when determining negligence, comparative negligence, fault, or damages.

New Law (Language Newly Added):

  • Now, under this new legislation, the failure of a vehicle occupant to use an available seat belt CAN be considered as evidence in court. Specifically, seat belt non-use can now be introduced to help determine:
    • Negligence (carelessness)
    • Comparative negligence (shared fault between parties)
    • Causation (whether not using a seat belt contributed to causing injuries)
    • Assumption of risk (whether the occupant knowingly exposed themselves to a greater risk of injury)
    • Apportionment of fault (how much each party is to blame for an accident or injury)
    • To potentially reduce the amount of damages that person could receive because they did not wear a seat belt.
  • However, the court still retains authority to determine if the seat belt evidence should be admitted into trial based on standard rules of evidence (such as avoiding unfair prejudice).

Insurance Rates (Language Maintained and Slightly Adjusted):

  • The new language keeps the existing law clear on insurance:
    • Insurance companies still cannot increase premiums or cancel coverage based on the failure to wear a seat belt.

Why These Changes Matter:

  • Encouraging Safe Behavior: Allowing courts to consider seat belt use incentivizes people to buckle up, potentially reducing injuries and saving lives.
  • Fairness in Liability: This change permits juries to factor personal responsibility into their decisions, especially in cases where injuries are significantly worsened by not wearing seat belts.
  • Balancing Act: While seat belt non-use evidence can now influence liability and damages, insurance companies are still restricted from penalizing policyholders solely based on seat belt usage, preserving some consumer protections.

In short, Section 5 significantly shifts how Georgia courts handle seat belt evidence, allowing juries to consider an occupant’s failure to use a seat belt when determining fault and damages, but continues to protect drivers from insurance penalties related to seat belt usage.


Section 6 – New Provisions for “Negligent Security” Lawsuits (Adding a New Article under Title 51, Chapter 3):

Section 6 introduces entirely new laws governing when property owners, occupiers, and security contractors can be held responsible for injuries caused by criminal actions of third parties due to insufficient security (“negligent security”).

New Definitions (completely new language):

  • Negligent Security: Claims against property owners, managers, or security providers for injuries caused by failing to protect against foreseeable criminal acts by third parties.
  • Owner or Occupier: A person or entity who owns, leases, operates, manages, or maintains property.
  • Particularized Warning: Specific, credible information that an owner/occupier knows, indicating an immediate danger from a clearly identified third-party criminal act.
  • Prior Occurrences: Previous criminal incidents that are substantially similar and close enough to the new incident (location, time, circumstance) to make a crime reasonably predictable.
  • Security Contractor: A company or person contracted to provide protective or security services on the premises.
  • Wrongful Conduct: Any act violating Georgia criminal law, punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony, or intentional tortious acts.

Key Changes and New Legal Standards (fully new provisions):

When Property Owners or Occupiers Are Liable:

Under this new law, an owner/occupier can be liable for injuries to an invitee (someone legally invited onto the property, such as customers) caused by a criminal third party ONLY IF all these conditions are met:

  1. Foreseeability of Harm:
    • The owner had a specific and credible warning of an imminent criminal threat (particularized warning), OR
    • They should have known a crime was likely due to prior similar incidents on or near the property, or involving the same criminal actor.
  2. The injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the criminal’s actions.
  3. The crime was reasonably foreseeable due to a specific dangerous condition on the property that significantly increased the risk of criminal activity compared to surrounding areas.
  4. The owner/occupier failed to use ordinary care (reasonable steps) to fix or reduce this dangerous condition.
  5. This failure directly (proximately) led to the invitee’s injury.

Liability to a Licensee (someone allowed on property for personal reasons, but not expressly invited):

  • Liability is stricter. Owners/occupiers are liable to licensees only if they had specific, credible knowledge of an imminent criminal threat, and then acted willfully or wantonly (with reckless disregard) by failing entirely to protect against that threat.

Exceptions and Limits on Liability (entirely new rules):

Owners/occupiers are explicitly NOT LIABLE in negligent security cases when:

  • The injured party was a trespasser or was not on the premises at all.
  • The crime occurred off-premises.
  • The criminal actor was a tenant or guest of a tenant undergoing eviction proceedings.
  • The injured party was committing (or came onto the property intending to commit) a felony or misdemeanor involving theft, burglary, or similar offenses.
  • The injury occurred at a single-family residence.
  • The owner/occupier received a specific criminal threat and promptly reported it to law enforcement (e.g., calling 911), which is deemed sufficient to fulfill their security responsibility.

Security Contractors’ Liability (fully new rules):

  • Security contractors who assume responsibility for security have liability similar to property owners and occupiers, subject to identical restrictions and limits. However, security contractors’ liability can never exceed that of the property owner.

Standard of Care and Apportionment of Fault (entirely new requirements):

  • Property owners/occupiers do not have to take extraordinary measures or assume law enforcement duties.
  • Courts must consider factors like existing security measures, additional practical measures available, and governmental roles in public safety.
  • Fault in negligent security cases must now be explicitly divided among:
    • Property owners/occupiers
    • The actual criminal who committed the harm
    • Other responsible parties, if applicable
  • If juries fail to apportion reasonable fault to the criminal responsible for the injury, the court must order a new trial. A presumption exists that juries must assign more fault to criminals than to the property owner unless rebutted by strong evidence.
  • Restrictions on Trial Evidence: Parties cannot discuss potential criminal penalties or incarceration of third-party criminals, their financial resources, or how assigning fault affects the injured person’s damage awards.

Practical Impact of These Changes:

  • Provides clearer rules that limit property owners’ exposure to liability, requiring strong evidence of foreseeability and direct connection to specific risks or previous crimes.
  • Clarifies when owners/occupiers or security contractors must take preventive measures and provides strong protections if they promptly report criminal threats to law enforcement.
  • Creates uniformity and predictability in how negligent security lawsuits are handled in Georgia, significantly benefiting businesses, property owners, and security providers by reducing frivolous or tenuous lawsuits.

Why These Changes Matter:

  • Protects businesses and property owners by setting higher standards to prove negligent security claims.
  • Encourages proactive security measures, clearly defining what steps property owners or occupiers should take.
  • Balances responsibilities between private entities and public law enforcement, clearly stating that private businesses do not have to take on governmental security roles.

In short, Section 6 establishes a comprehensive and clearly defined legal framework limiting and clarifying negligent security claims, setting strict conditions for liability, clearly defining responsibilities, and significantly reshaping how these types of lawsuits will proceed in Georgia courts.


Section 7 – New Rules for Recovering Medical and Healthcare Expenses in Injury Lawsuits (New Code Section 51-12-1.1):

Section 7 adds a completely new code section (51-12-1.1) to Georgia law, establishing how medical and healthcare expenses can be claimed and proven in civil lawsuits involving personal injury or wrongful death.


Key Provisions and Changes (All New Language):

(a) Medical and Healthcare Expenses Limited to “Reasonable Value”:

  • Under this new law, when someone sues for injuries or wrongful death, they can only recover medical expenses based on the reasonable value of medically necessary treatment.

(b) Jury Determines the Amount of Reasonable Expenses:

  • The amount considered “reasonable” for medical costs is decided by the jury (or judge in bench trials), rather than automatically based on the amounts listed on medical bills.

(c) Evidence Required if Plaintiff Has Insurance:

  • If the injured party has health insurance (private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, workers’ comp, etc.), evidence about medical expenses must now include both:
    • The total amounts originally billed for the treatment, and
    • The actual amount needed to fully satisfy the medical charges under the insurance plan or workers’ compensation program.
  • This applies even if the plaintiff did not use their insurance to pay for medical expenses or does not plan to use insurance.

Practical Meaning:
The jury will see both the original inflated “sticker price” of medical bills and the reduced amount typically paid by insurers, allowing juries to determine a realistic, fair value of medical services.


(d) “Letters of Protection” and Other Payment Arrangements Must Be Disclosed:

  • A “Letter of Protection” (or similar arrangement) occurs when a medical provider agrees to treat the patient without immediate payment, in exchange for a promise to pay from any future legal settlement or judgment.
  • Under this new rule, certain information becomes discoverable (must be shared in court) if treatment is provided under these special arrangements, including:
    • A copy of the actual letter or agreement.
    • A detailed, itemized list of medical charges, coded according to accepted medical billing practices.
    • If the healthcare provider sells the patient’s medical bill to a debt collector or third-party at a discount, the name of that third-party and the discounted amount paid must also be disclosed.
    • Information about who referred the injured party for treatment under a Letter of Protection or similar arrangement.

Practical Meaning:
This transparency requirement helps reveal whether medical bills presented to juries are artificially inflated or whether a provider’s relationship with attorneys might affect the costs of care.


(e) Changes to the Collateral Source Rule (Significant Legal Shift):

  • Georgia traditionally applied a legal doctrine called the collateral source rule, which prevented juries from considering whether the injured party had their medical bills paid by insurance or another third-party source. Previously, juries saw only full, inflated medical bills, unaware if insurance covered or greatly reduced those bills.
  • This new law explicitly changes that rule. The legislation intends to limit the collateral source rule to allow juries to see evidence of actual payments made (or expected to be made) by insurers or other third parties toward medical expenses.
  • However, judges still have authority to instruct juries clearly to avoid confusion, ensuring jurors understand exactly how this new evidence should affect their decision-making.

Practical Meaning:
Juries can now consider the actual costs paid (rather than just billed charges), likely reducing awarded medical damages to amounts closer to what insurers usually pay, rather than inflated billing amounts.


(f) No Limits on Challenging Medical Expenses:

  • Finally, the bill explicitly states that nothing in this section prevents either plaintiffs or defendants from introducing evidence or testimony that challenges:
    • The reasonableness of medical expenses already incurred or projected future costs.
    • Whether the medical treatment received was necessary.

Why These Changes Matter:

  • Reduced Inflated Awards: This provision will likely reduce awards for medical expenses by giving juries a more realistic picture of actual medical costs, not inflated charges.
  • Transparency: Revealing actual payments, insurance adjustments, and special financial arrangements gives jurors a clearer, more accurate basis for awarding fair damages.
  • Preventing Abuse: The rules regarding Letters of Protection or third-party financial arrangements reduce opportunities for artificially inflated medical claims and ensure juries have transparent information.

Summary of Impact:

Section 7 fundamentally changes how medical and healthcare expenses are calculated and presented to juries in personal injury lawsuits in Georgia. By allowing juries to see both billed amounts and actual payments (like insurance reimbursements), and by requiring transparency for special financial arrangements, the bill aims to reduce inflated damage awards and ensure a fairer system based on realistic medical costs.


Section 8 – New Option for Splitting (“Bifurcating”) Trials into Separate Phases (New Code Section 51-12-15):

Section 8 introduces an entirely new procedure into Georgia law, allowing parties involved in civil lawsuits for bodily injury or wrongful death to request splitting trials into separate phases (called “bifurcation”). This section specifically addresses how courts and juries handle fault, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.


Detailed Breakdown of New Procedures:

(a) New Option to Split the Trial:

Any party involved in a lawsuit seeking damages for injury or wrongful death can now request (“elect”) that the trial be divided into separate phases. This request must be made in writing before the court finalizes the pretrial order (the pretrial order sets the issues for trial).

If a party elects this option, the trial proceeds in clearly defined phases:

Phase One (Determining Fault Only):

  • The jury first determines if any defendants are at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries or death.
  • If the jury finds defendants at fault, it must also assign specific percentages of fault among all defendants and any other responsible parties (this is called “apportionment of fault”).
  • Importantly, no discussion or evidence of the actual amount of damages (money owed for injury or death) is allowed in this first phase. The focus is solely on fault.

Phase Two (Determining Compensatory Damages Only):

  • If, after Phase One, any defendant is found at fault, the trial continues immediately with the same judge and jury.
  • In this phase, the jury only hears evidence and arguments about compensatory damages—the amount of money needed to compensate the plaintiff for medical costs, lost wages, pain and suffering, etc.

Phase Three (If Needed—Punitive Damages & Attorney’s Fees):

  • If the jury awards compensatory damages in Phase Two, the trial can continue immediately into another phase (with the same jury and judge) to determine punitive damages (damages intended to punish defendants for especially harmful conduct), attorney’s fees, court costs, or litigation expenses if legally permitted.

(b) Court’s Authority to Reject Trial Splitting (Exceptions):

The new rule allows courts to reject a party’s request to split a trial under specific circumstances:

  • Exception 1 (Sensitive Cases):
    • If the plaintiff (or a minor represented by the plaintiff) suffered an alleged sexual offense, and the court believes splitting the trial could cause severe psychological or emotional harm to the victim by forcing them to testify more than once, the court can reject splitting the trial.
  • Exception 2 (Small Claims):
    • If the total amount of money in dispute is less than $150,000, the court can refuse to split the trial into phases. This avoids unnecessary complexity in lower-value lawsuits.

Practical Implications of These Changes:

  • Efficiency & Clarity: Separating fault determination from damages can streamline trials. If no defendant is found liable in the first phase, there’s no need for lengthy testimony about medical expenses or damages.
  • Fairness & Neutrality: This approach prevents evidence about severe injuries or substantial financial losses from influencing the jury’s impartial determination of who is actually at fault.
  • Potentially Lower Awards: Splitting trials could result in more balanced verdicts, as juries decide fault without sympathy or bias related to damages.

Why This Matters:

  • For Plaintiffs: Clearly structured trials might help juries focus more effectively on the severity of damages, especially if liability is clearly established first.
  • For Defendants: It can reduce prejudicial impact from sympathetic injury evidence when determining fault.
  • For Courts: Encourages efficient use of judicial resources, avoiding unnecessary trials or lengthy hearings on damages when liability isn’t established.

In Summary:

Section 8 introduces a significant new procedural tool into Georgia civil litigation by explicitly allowing parties to split trials into multiple phases—first to establish liability, and then to assess damages separately—unless the court finds it impractical or potentially harmful in specific sensitive cases.


Section 9 – Effective Date and Applicability of the New Law:

This section outlines exactly when and how the new legislation becomes effective and to which cases or claims it applies.


(a) When the Law Takes Effect:

  • This new law becomes effective immediately upon approval by the Governor (signing the bill) or automatically upon becoming law if the Governor takes no action within the allowed timeframe.

(b) Applicability of Different Sections:

  • Sections 6 and 7 (the new provisions related to negligent security and recovery of medical/healthcare expenses):
    • These sections apply only to claims or lawsuits arising after the effective date of the Act.
    • Any incidents, injuries, or claims that occurred before this law takes effect remain governed by the previous Georgia law.
  • All Other Sections of this bill (such as rules about arguing noneconomic damages, trial procedures, voluntary dismissals, attorney’s fees, and seat belt evidence):
    • The legislature intends that these sections apply immediately to all pending lawsuits or claims at the time the law takes effect.
    • The only exception is if applying these rules immediately would be unconstitutional—meaning courts might limit applicability if it violates someone’s constitutional rights in a specific case.

Practical Meaning:

  • Immediate Changes:
    • For most procedural rules (like arguing noneconomic damages or voluntary dismissals), courts and litigants must adapt immediately once the bill is enacted, even in ongoing cases.
    • Existing cases may experience immediate procedural shifts, potentially affecting ongoing litigation strategies.
  • Prospective Changes:
    • New laws significantly altering substantive rights—such as new rules about negligent security liability or medical expense calculations—will not disrupt current lawsuits. These apply only to new incidents or claims arising after enactment.

Why This Matters:

  • Clearly defines transition rules, providing certainty for courts, lawyers, businesses, and individuals about exactly how and when these significant changes will be applied.
  • Protects fairness by not retroactively changing laws that affect fundamental rights or outcomes of incidents that already occurred.
  • Allows immediate improvements in court efficiency and procedural fairness without disrupting substantive legal rights in pending litigation.

Summary of Impact:

Section 9 ensures a clear and orderly transition to the new legal framework, applying procedural reforms immediately while respecting existing rights by limiting major substantive changes to future cases only.


Section 10 – Repeal of Conflicting Laws:

This final section of the bill states simply and explicitly:

  • All laws or parts of laws in Georgia that conflict or contradict the provisions in this new legislation are officially repealed (removed from law).

Practical Meaning:

  • Once this bill becomes law, it overrides and replaces any previous Georgia laws or legal provisions that might conflict with the new rules outlined in Sections 1 through 9 of this bill.
  • This repeal is standard language typically included at the end of new legislation to ensure legal consistency and prevent confusion over which rules apply.

Why This Matters:

  • Ensures clarity and consistency:
    It eliminates potential confusion or conflicts between old laws and the new rules, so everyone clearly understands the legal obligations and rights under the updated Georgia law.
  • Provides legal certainty:
    Courts, attorneys, businesses, and individuals can confidently apply the new rules, knowing old contradictory rules no longer apply.

Summary of Impact:

Section 10 is a standard yet critical provision ensuring that the new legislation operates smoothly and clearly, removing all previous contradictory laws to avoid confusion and uncertainty in legal processes moving forward.

What Happened Today and What’s Next?

The House version of SB 68 barely passed 91 to 82. Because the Senate version has been amendment by the House it will now move back to the Senate for either a vote to agree to the House changes or the Senate may ask for a conference committee to be formed between the two chambers to hash out the differences in the House and Senate versions.

If the Senate agrees in a floor vote to the House changes it will move to the Governor’s desk for signature and will become law.

If a conference committee is formed, it will be made up of three Senators and three Representatives who will negotiate a final version of the legislation which is referred to as a Conference Committee Report. It will require 5 of those six members to agree in order for the report to be voted on again in both chambers. If that report passes, it would move to the Governor for signature.

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